Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan: A new region of instability?
The Triad of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is a region full of activity, though often for the wrong reasons. Here, communal life is broken, international borders are breached daily, and both militants and militaries carry out secret operations, each looking for the next power grab. In recent years, the region has become even more violent and unstable, exceeding its usual turmoil. Reciprocal skirmishes now make it one of the world's most dangerous areas.
In January, Baluchi insurgents launched attacks across
borders into Iran and Pakistan. The Iranian Air Force responded by bombing
covert groups within Pakistan, prompting Pakistan to strike hostile camps in
Iran. Later in March, Pakistan's Air Force targeted Taliban units in
Afghanistan in retaliation for an earlier assault. Meanwhile, a different
Taliban unit had hit Iranian positions near the border a year prior. More
recently, in October, separatists attacked Karachi Airport, killing Chinese
engineers. These incidents highlight just how intertwined insurgency and local
grievances have become.
The 2024 Global Terrorism Index now ranks Pakistan as the
fourth most affected by militancy, Afghanistan at sixth, and Iran at
twenty-sixth. In this region, nationalists, jihadists, militants, and
governments all fight for supremacy, but things are getting worse with each
attack. The Triad is now slowly merging into a single battle space, and borders
have become like chalk lines—bold today, smudged tomorrow.
Global terrorism index rankings
Credits GTI
Map of greater Khorasan
Khorasan and creation of Durand line
Beneath the contemporary boundaries of Central Asia lies the
ghost of Khorasan, echoing the memories of ancient empires. Once a rich
cultural and political centre, Khorasan was ruled by various Turkic and Iranian
monarchs, each vying for dominance. Yet, the seat of power shifted so often
that no unified authority ever developed. As a result, Khorasan became Asia's
version of the Wild West.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, Khorasan became a
battleground for the Russian and British Empires, which sought to take up
defensible positions. The Russians advanced from the northern steppes, while
the British came up from the south. What followed was a period of intense
geopolitical conflict that gradually eroded Khorasan's shared identity. Caught
in the crossfire was the young Afghan state. Both Russia and Britain sought to
control it. After years of back-and-forth hostility, a peace treaty was signed in
1893 that turned Afghanistan into a British client state.
Durand line
Image credits: Wikipedia
The peace treaty, crafted by Henry Durand, established the
border between British India and Afghanistan by drawing a line straight across
the map, which he named after himself. Durand simply calculated how far British
infantry could fire from their westernmost posts and marked the line
accordingly. No consideration was given to geography, history, or even existing
realities on the ground. Nonetheless, the Durand Line was signed and imposed on
the region. For the locals, however, the agreement was a disaster. It cut
straight through ethnic communities that had existed together for centuries.
Impact on Pashtun community
The Pashtun people were particularly affected, as the new
border divided their towns and cities. Pashtuns were the rulers of Afghanistan,
and while many Pashtun areas remained in Afghanistan, many more were left
outside of it. This included Peshawar, the city of pearls. For the Pashtuns,
losing Peshawar felt like losing an arm or a leg—it was a reality they could
not accept. Even now, a century later, successive Afghan governments have
continued rejecting the Durand Line, adding to the tension. Nearly three times
as many Pashtuns live in Pakistan as in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, this
fuels strong irredentist feelings in Kabul, which is why Afghanistan claims
Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan regions.
If an Afghan government were ever able to unite the Pashtun
people into a single political entity, Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan, which
currently accounts for about 40% of the population, would grow stronger.
Moreover, Afghan control over sparsely populated Baluchistan would give it
access to the world's oceans. These two goals—becoming an ethnic majority and
escaping landlocked isolation—could then serve as the foundation for a modern,
centralized Afghan state. This vision for nation-building has been shared by
all Afghan governments, old and new. That includes the Taliban.
Rise of Taliban and emergence of Pashtun nationalism
Emerging in the wake of the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan, the Taliban ruled the country from 1996 to 2001 following a civil war, and once again since 2021 after the American withdrawal. Although the Taliban avoid openly presenting themselves as strict Pashtun nationalists, their origins and beliefs are deeply rooted in Pashtun culture. Like past Afghan governments, the Taliban strongly opposes the Durand Line—so much so that it draws strength from it. For example, the Pakistani Taliban, which is different from the Afghan Taliban, exists solely to undo Pakistan's control over Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the region that is home to Peshawar city and where the Pashtun make up the majority.
Islamabad designated the Pakistani Taliban a terrorist group in 2008, leading to fierce fighting between the two. Since then, thousands have been killed. The Pakistani Taliban has carried out attacks on schools, taken hostages, bombed mosques, and more. However, these clashes make for an unusual conflict. Islamabad and the Afghan Taliban have historically had close ties, but this relationship has cooled as the Afghan Taliban shares a deeper bond with the Pakistani Taliban. Even so, much of the hostility unfolds along the Durand Line, with the Pakistani Taliban carrying out attacks, kidnappings, and other extremist actions. Meanwhile, Pakistan responds with drone and missile strikes but must carefully avoid targeting the Afghan Taliban. So, yes, it is an unusual conflict.
To make matters worse, in 2015, ISIS Khorasan, or ISIS-K for short, emerged as one of the militant groups thriving from the turmoil. Although it has global ambitions, ISIS-K has mostly focused on fighting Kabul, not Islamabad, since it doesn't consider Pakistan to be part of historic Khorasan. Either way, with the Taliban back in control of Kabul, old wounds have reopened, and new ones have appeared. In their pursuit of dominance, Taliban leaders have now allied with several Baluch sectarian groups.
Baluchistan: Separatism and relations with Taliban
The Baluch have a lot in common with the Pashtun. They, too, are a divided people. Most live in Pakistan, where, despite numbering in the millions, they make up less than 4% of the population. As such, there is a sense of marginalization within the Baluch community, and many feel that their cultural identity is under threat. This feeling of vulnerability extends to the Iranian side as well. Unlike the majority Shia Iranians, Baluchis are mostly Sunni. Because of these differences in language and religion, Baluch people are Iran's most alienated ethnic group and thus the most inclined toward separatism. And Baluch separatist groups are plenty. There is the Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF for short). It was formed in 1964 and has roots in the anti-colonial and nationalist movements of that era. There is also the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA for short). This one was formed in the year 2000 as an offshoot of the BLF. However, unlike its parent group, the BLA rejects the political process and advocates solely for military action. Both the BLF and BLA primarily operate within Pakistan. Over in Iran, meanwhile, there is Jaish al-Adl, a jihadist unit with similar goals. It was formed in 2012 and is believed to be funded by Saudi Arabia and the United States.
In recent years, all three Baluch separatist groups have
acquired American weapons and equipment from the Taliban. That new firepower
has led to deadlier attacks than ever. In Pakistan, Baluch groups have targeted
buses, trains, and bridges. In the first 10 months of 2024, there were 624
deaths and nearly as many injuries. August was especially deadly, with 254
people killed in one month alone. Baluch militants are also particularly
hostile to Chinese interests. In March, five Chinese engineers were killed,
followed by an attack on a Chinese facility later. A blast near Karachi Airport
killed two more Chinese engineers.
Things have been tensed on the Iranian side too. Last year,
11 Iranian police officers were killed near the city of Zahedan. In response,
Iran launched missile and drone strikes into Pakistani territory, which led to
civilian casualties. Of course, Islamabad had to set the record straight and
responded with airstrikes into Iran, resulting in nine deaths. All the same,
the Baluch militants aim to create an independent state from parts of Iran,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Arguably, it's shortsighted of the Taliban to ally
with the Baluch groups, given their conflicting territorial claims. However,
the prevailing belief is that they would cross that bridge after stripping away
territories from Iran and Pakistan. For now, though, by joining forces with the
Baluch militias, the Taliban are making a play for Pakistan's Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan regions but without saying as much.
Tensions between Afghanistan and Iran: A place of
contested resources
One of the main sources of turmoil in this region is the
availability of resources, or lack thereof. The water conflict between Iran and
Afghanistan is a prime example of this struggle. As a country with towering
peaks, most of Afghanistan's water flows from the Hindu Kush, which stretches
across its northern and central regions. These glacial mountains feed the
country's hydroelectric and agricultural systems, making water one of
Afghanistan's most critical resources. However, rivers originating in
Afghanistan do not stop at its borders; they flow into neighbouring countries,
including Iran, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan. This has led to ongoing disputes
over water rights, particularly between Iran and Afghanistan.
The primary point of contention lies in the Helmand River,
which flows from the Hindu Kush through Afghanistan and into Iran's Sistan
Basin. Historically, the Helmand River has been a lifeline for the arid regions
of southeastern Iran, supplying water for agriculture and domestic use.
However, Afghanistan’s efforts to harness its water resources through
dam-building projects have significantly reduced the river's flow into Iran.
The Kamal Khan Dam, completed in 2021, is the latest in a series of developments
that have strained relations between the two countries.
Iran accuses Afghanistan of violating a 1973 water-sharing
treaty, which allocates a specific volume of water from the Helmand River to
Iran annually. Afghan authorities, on the other hand, argue that the treaty is
outdated and does not account for the growing needs of their population. The
construction of dams and irrigation systems in Afghanistan has further
exacerbated tensions, with Iranian officials alleging that these projects are
deliberately designed to restrict water flow to their country.
This conflict reached a boiling point in 2023 when Iran
threatened military action if its water demands were not met. The Afghan
Taliban government, which is already grappling with internal instability and
external pressures, responded defiantly, asserting its sovereign right to
manage its natural resources. Skirmishes along the border and fiery rhetoric
from both sides have made the Helmand River a flashpoint for potential conflict
in an already volatile region.
Beyond the Helmand River, other transboundary rivers like
the Harirud and the Kabul River also present challenges. The Harirud River,
which flows through Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, has been the subject
of disputes over irrigation and dam construction. Similarly, the Kabul River,
which flows into Pakistan, has led to disagreements between Afghanistan and
Pakistan over water usage. These conflicts underscore the broader issue of
water scarcity in the region, where climate change and population growth are
intensifying competition for dwindling resources.
Looming mistrust: impact on stability and the future of the
region
Addressing these water disputes requires cooperative
diplomacy and sustainable management of shared water resources. However, given
the mistrust and geopolitical rivalries between Iran, Afghanistan, and their
neighbours, achieving such cooperation remains an uphill battle. For now, the
water conflict serves as yet another layer of complexity in a region already
plagued by ethnic, political, and security challenges.
As water becomes increasingly scarce and essential for
survival, the stakes will only rise, adding to the already fragile dynamics of
the Triad. Whether through negotiation or confrontation, the way these nations
address their shared water resources will undoubtedly shape the future of the
region.
Proxy Provocation Theory: The Escalating Risk of
Full-Scale War in South Asia
The region stretching from Pakistan's Northwest to Iran's
Southeast and Afghanistan's South is increasingly merging into a single
volatile battle space. Ethno-nationalist and ideological forces, exacerbated by
human trafficking, drug smuggling, jihadist fighters, fringe militias, and
separatist factions, are blending into a self-destructive security crisis. This
triad—Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan—has become one of the most dangerous
places on Earth. As tensions continue to rise, the conflict could escalate
beyond these groups and involve direct confrontation between the national
governments of these countries, possibly triggering a full-scale war. This is
where the concept of Proxy Provocation Theory comes into play.
Understanding Proxies and Provocation
A strategy in which
states indirectly pursue their political or military goals by supporting
non-state actors—such as militant groups, separatists, or insurgents—within an
adversary’s territory. By backing these proxies, the state can destabilize its
enemy while maintaining plausible deniability. This tactic avoids direct
military confrontation, sidestepping international scrutiny and the potential
costs of war. Proxies, often funded, trained, or sheltered by the sponsoring
state, operate in areas where the state either cannot or does not want to act
overtly. These groups can disrupt governance, exploit local grievances, or even
carry out attacks to weaken the adversary.
While it offers short-term strategic advantages, it also
carries significant risks. Proxies can act autonomously, pursuing agendas that
conflict with the intentions of their sponsors. Furthermore, these proxy wars
can quickly spiral out of control, escalating regional instability and
provoking retaliatory actions that entangle the sponsoring state in prolonged
conflicts. Over time, this cycle of violence becomes difficult to manage,
increasing the likelihood of a full-scale war.
The Role of Proxies in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict
In the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Taliban and the
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) play crucial roles in this proxy conflict.
Pakistan, which supported the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s as a counterbalance
to Indian influence, has historically seen the Taliban as a strategic ally. The
Pakistani military and intelligence agencies valued the Taliban's presence in
Afghanistan for maintaining stability along its western border. However,
relations began to sour after the Taliban retook power in 2021. A key issue was
the Taliban’s refusal to expel or act against the TTP, an insurgent group that
has waged a bloody insurgency against Pakistan for over a decade.
The TTP, operating from Afghan soil, has carried out
multiple attacks within Pakistan. In December 2024, a deadly attack by the TTP
on Pakistani forces led to retaliatory airstrikes by Pakistan inside
Afghanistan. This military response prompted the Taliban to deploy 15,000
troops to the border in early January 2025, heightening the risk of further
violence. Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif openly declared that
Pakistan "cannot move forward without crushing the Taliban,"
signaling the worsening of hostilities.
For Afghanistan, the Taliban’s harbouring of the TTP could
be seen as a strategic tool to pressure Pakistan. The Taliban’s reluctance to
crack down on the TTP may stem from ideological alignment or shared ethnic
ties, or it could be a calculated decision to use the group as leverage in disputes
such as the Durand Line—a long-standing border issue between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. By enabling the TTP, the Taliban forces Pakistan to focus on
internal security challenges, weakening its ability to exert influence over
Afghanistan.
Proxy Provocations and Their Escalating Impact
Pakistan’s use of drone strikes inside Afghanistan,
including the 2022 operation that killed Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in
Kabul, has further strained relations. These strikes, which were part of
Pakistan’s broader strategy to target high-value militants, have exacerbated
Afghan suspicions. The drone operations reinforce the idea of proxy
provocations from both sides. Meanwhile, the Taliban has accused Pakistan of
exacerbating the conflict by supporting U.S. drone strikes and violating Afghan
sovereignty. This back-and-forth between the two nations is a textbook example
of Proxy Provocation Theory, with each state using proxies and covert
operations to achieve strategic goals while avoiding direct military
confrontation.
Pakistan-Taliban Relations: From Allies to Adversaries
Historically, Pakistan and the Taliban maintained strong
ties. Pakistan supported the Taliban during the 1990s and again after the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, seeing the group as a counterweight to Indian
influence. However, after the Taliban’s resurgence in 2021, relations took a
sharp downturn. The Taliban’s refusal to expel or crack down on the TTP led to
increasing violence along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where skirmishes
between Pakistani forces and Taliban-linked groups became more frequent. The
situation worsened in late December 2024 when Pakistan carried out airstrikes
inside Afghanistan in retaliation for a TTP attack.
Despite these rising tensions, Pakistan continued to rely on
its relationship with the Taliban, largely due to the strategic importance of
Afghanistan in regional geopolitics. However, the Taliban's actions, including
their mediation of negotiations between Pakistan and the TTP, have undermined
Pakistan’s expectations. These negotiations, which resulted in a brief
ceasefire in late 2021, were not enough to prevent the resumption of violence
after the ceasefire expired. As the TTP continues to carry out attacks,
Pakistan finds itself caught in a vicious cycle of violence and retaliation.
Further Tensions: Deportation Crisis and Separatist
Movements
The conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban intensified in
2023 when Pakistan announced the deportation of 2 million undocumented Afghans,
leading to over 500,000 deportations. The Taliban condemned this move as
unacceptable, but Pakistan proceeded with the expulsions, citing security
concerns. Alongside this, Pakistan has been grappling with violence from Baloch
separatist groups in its southwestern border regions. These internal
challenges, coupled with the ongoing conflict with the TTP, made 2024 one of
the deadliest years for Pakistani security forces.
The increasing violence in Pakistan, driven by both the TTP
and separatist groups, as well as the tensions with Afghanistan, creates a
volatile situation that could easily escalate into full-scale war. Pakistan’s
political and economic instability, exacerbated by reliance on IMF bailouts and
internal divisions, coupled with the Taliban’s governance challenges and
unpopularity, increases the likelihood of conflict. If the TTP attacks continue
to escalate, as they did in 2024, Pakistan may be pushed toward war as a means
of unifying its divided population and addressing its security concerns.
The situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the surrounding
region is approaching a dangerous tipping point. Proxy provocations have
created an environment of constant tension, and the risk of a full-scale war
between Pakistan and the Taliban, or between other regional powers, looms
large. As the influence of proxies grows, it becomes more challenging for
national governments to control their respective borders and maintain
stability. With internal instability and escalating violence, the region is at
a crossroads, and unless diplomatic efforts are intensified, the possibility of
all-out war remains a very real threat.
References:
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/pakistan-baluchistan-gunmen-1.7304790
https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/09/asia/pakistan-train-station-bomb-blast-intl-hnk/index.html
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/may/30/iran-and-afghanistan-clash-over-water-rights
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durand_Line
Analyzing the Role of Great Powers in Creating the Durand
Line and Its Impact on Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations- Yar,Ihsan,Hafiz
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/08/taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-airstrikes-clashes/
Comments
Post a Comment