The new shift in Japanese foreign policy reviewed

The history of Japan-China relations is a turbulent story, with periods of relative friendliness being replaced by periods of hostility in a repeating cycle that has gone on for decades. In recent years, this relationship has deteriorated as China more aggressively asserts its disputed territorial claims, Japan increases its defense spending, and issues ranging from visas to seafood inflame tensions. However, in the past few months, there has been a noticeable effort to rebuild the relationship.

The recent downturn in Japan-China relations has several reasons. One of these was Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's ongoing support for Vladimir Putin's regime in 2022. Alluding to potential future Chinese military action, Japan’s then-prime minister, Fumio Kishida, warned that "Ukraine today might be the East Asia of tomorrow," and his government initiated a major military buildup, strengthened Japan’s partnership with the United States and other U.S. allies in the region like South Korea and the Philippines, and took steps to counter China. Another long-running source of tension between the two countries is the dispute over the Senkaku Islands, located in the East China Sea, which are controlled and administered by Japan but claimed by China, which refers to them as the Diaoyu Islands. The uninhabited islands are in a strategically significant location near Japan, China, and Taiwan, close to important shipping lanes and oil and gas reserves. China has frequently asserted its claim by dispatching Coast Guard ships and other vessels to the waters around the islands. In fact, 2024 was the third consecutive year that a record was set for the number of days that Chinese government vessels were spotted in the Senkaku Islands' contiguous zone. China has also, at times, placed so-called hydrometeorological buoys within Japan’s exclusive economic zone near the islands, prompting condemnation from Japan.

The difficult relations have not just been based on territorial or military issues. In 2023, China imposed a blanket ban—eventually lifted—on the import of Japanese seafood after Japan, with approval from the International Atomic Energy Agency, began releasing treated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean. The two countries have also been at odds over visa reciprocity, and in 2024, Japan’s foreign minister demanded that China crack down on "groundless, malicious, and anti-Japanese sentiment," particularly on social media, following the fatal stabbing of a Japanese child in China.

Before these recent events, there had been nominal efforts to warm relations, with both sides agreeing on their desire for a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests and a commitment to building constructive and stable Japan-China relations. Some progress was indeed made under Kishida toward the end of his time as prime minister. For example, China began to ease its ban on Japanese seafood. However, in recent months, two factors have provided fresh impetus for Japan and China to improve their ties. The first was Kishida’s resignation and subsequent replacement as Japanese prime minister by Shigeru Ishiba, and the second was the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency.

But why the shift from US even happen?:

In recent years, Japan's relationship with the West, particularly the United States, has undergone significant changes, characterized by both strengthened ties and emerging points of divergence. This essay examines the complexities of Japan's foreign policy, its response to international crises, and the potential impact of changing U.S. leadership on Japan-U.S. relations.

Japan's Independent Foreign Policy

Japan's foreign policy has demonstrated a degree of independence from U.S. positions, particularly evident in its response to the Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Gaza conflict. This divergence highlights Japan's nuanced approach to international affairs and its willingness to chart its own course on certain issues.

In the immediate aftermath of Hamas's October 7th attack on Israel, Japan's response was notably cautious. While condemning Hamas's actions, the Japanese government initially refrained from using the term "terrorism" or endorsing Israel's right to self-defense. Although these elements were eventually incorporated into Japan's official stance, the delay in doing so set Japan apart from its G7 allies.

Perhaps most strikingly, Japan's Prime Minister was the only G7 leader not to sign a joint statement in October 2023 expressing support for Israel's right to defend itself. The Japanese government justified this decision by noting that, unlike other G7 nations, Japan was not directly affected by citizen kidnappings or casualties resulting from the conflict.

This cautious approach did not go unnoticed by international media. Reuters reported that Japan was resisting pressure to align with the pro-Israel stance of the U.S., while Japan's Asahi Shimbun observed that Japan appeared isolated within the G7, of which it was the chair at the time.

Japan's divergence from U.S. positions was further evident in its voting patterns at the United Nations. On October 18, 2023, Japan voted in favor of a UN Security Council draft resolution calling for humanitarian pauses in Gaza, which was vetoed by the U.S. Later, in April 2024, Japan supported granting full UN membership to Palestine, a move that was again vetoed by the U.S. in the Security Council.

While these actions do not necessarily indicate a fundamental rift between Japan and the U.S., they underscore Japan's willingness to adopt independent stances on foreign policy issues, even when they differ from those of its closest ally.

The Nippon Steel-U.S. Steel Controversy

A more direct point of tension between Japan and the U.S. emerged with the blocked acquisition of U.S. Steel by Nippon Steel. This incident has highlighted the potential for economic disagreements to strain even the closest of alliances.

In early January 2025, U.S. President Joe Biden blocked Nippon Steel's nearly $15 billion takeover bid for U.S. Steel, citing national security concerns. This decision fulfilled Biden's earlier promise to keep U.S. Steel under domestic ownership but sparked anger from both U.S. Steel and Nippon Steel, leading to lawsuits challenging the blocking order.

The Japanese government's response to this decision was notably critical. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Biden's action raised concerns about future Japanese investment in the U.S. and called on the U.S. government to clearly explain the national security rationale behind the decision. This point seemed particularly sensitive given Japan's status as a close U.S. ally.

The controversy has raised questions about the consistency of U.S. policy regarding economic cooperation with allies. The chair of Japan's largest business lobby pointed out the apparent contradiction between the U.S. advocacy for "friend-shoring" and cooperation with like-minded countries and its decision to block a major investment from a close ally.

Adding fuel to the fire were inflammatory comments from the CEO of Cleveland Cliffs, an American steel maker interested in acquiring U.S. Steel. His accusation that "Japan is evil" and worse than China in terms of steel dumping practices further strained the diplomatic atmosphere.

The Trump Factor

The potential return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency introduces additional uncertainties into the Japan-U.S. relationship. While Trump had a good relationship with former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his first term, recent developments suggest potential challenges ahead. Trump's team declined a request from current Prime Minister Kishida for an in-person meeting in November 2024, citing rules on foreign meetings before taking office. However, the fact that Trump met with other world leaders during this period did not go unnoticed in Japan.

Looking ahead, Japan has three main concerns regarding a potential Trump presidency:

1. Demands for increased payments for U.S. military presence in Japan. Trump's previous calls for allies to pay more for U.S. protection could strain the alliance, especially given Kishida's view that the current arrangement already favors the U.S.

2. Potential tariffs on Japanese exports. Trump's protectionist stance and focus on trade deficits could lead to new tariffs on Japanese goods, particularly in the automotive sector.

3. Fear of being sidelined in U.S. negotiations with other countries. Japanese policymakers remember how Trump engaged with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2018 without significant consultation with Japan.

These concerns may be contributing to an apparent warming of relations between Japan and China. Prime Minister Kishida has expressed a goal of improving Japan-China relations, holding his first bilateral meeting with Xi Jinping in the same month that Trump rejected a meeting. Additionally, senior officials from Japan's and China's ruling parties held their first official dialogue in six years, suggesting a possible revival of Japan's "dual hedging" strategy.

A month and a half after becoming Japanese prime minister, Ishiba had a face-to-face meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping during a summit in Peru, where the two leaders affirmed that they would promote the two countries’ mutually beneficial relationship. Japan’s foreign minister, Yoko Kamikawa, subsequently visited China and announced that Japan would implement visa-loosening measures for Chinese nationals, reciprocating China’s move to resume visa waivers for Japanese nationals. The two countries also restarted the Japan-China Ruling Party Exchange Council for the first time in six years, with a delegation from Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party visiting China in mid-January. There has also been talk of China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, visiting Japan this month, as well as a possible visit to China by Prime Minister Ishiba in May. It was also announced this month that one of China’s contentious buoys had been removed from Japanese waters, although others remain in place.

A key reason for Japan's shift in its approach to China is Ishiba's leadership. His political background makes this shift unsurprising, as his political mentor was instrumental in normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China in the 1970s. Of all the candidates for the LDP leadership to replace Kishida, Ishiba was effectively the most moderate on China. He has spoken about the need to improve ties, cooperate in necessary areas, pursue realist diplomacy, and ensure that China’s stable development benefits the entire region. Some observers have noted that Ishiba is overtly pursuing the so-called "double hedge" strategy in Japan’s foreign policy—maintaining the strategically important partnership with the United States, which is key to Japan’s and the region’s security, while also keeping relations warm with China, Japan’s largest trade partner and one of the biggest investment destinations for Japanese companies.

The return of Donald Trump is another likely driver of China seeking warmer ties with Japan. China’s ongoing economic slowdown and the specter of new Trump tariffs increase the importance of its economic relationship with Japan. Additionally, driving a wedge between the U.S. and its ally Japan would be beneficial for Beijing, particularly after the hardening of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea anti-China alliance under Biden. At the same time, Trump’s return may also provide greater justification for Japan to seek warmer ties with China as a counterbalance. Ishiba’s first meeting with Trump earlier this month went unexpectedly well, with Ishiba offering to buy more American natural gas and pledging to boost Japan’s investment in the U.S. to $1 trillion, while Trump reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to defend Japan and promote a "free and open Indo-Pacific." However, that does not mean Japan is safe from Trump’s brewing trade war. While Japan has avoided targeted tariffs so far, it has been hit by Trump’s expanded and increased tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports.

While things related to China and Trump are going relatively smoothly from Ishiba’s perspective, maintaining this balance will not be easy. Some of the underlying causes of tension, such as the Senkaku Islands dispute, remain unresolved, meaning there is always a possibility for relations to deteriorate. Domestically, Ishiba is not in the strongest position either, leading a minority government with more hawkish members of his own party expressing discomfort or outright opposition to his swift diplomatic approach toward China. The coming months will test whether Japan’s strategy can yield long-term stability in its relationship with China.

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