New shift in Saudi's diplomatic policy away from Israel and warming up of relations with other powers

 

A few years ago, both Israel and the United States were optimistic about achieving peace in the Middle East through the Abraham Accords—a series of agreements aimed at normalizing relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours, most notably Saudi Arabia. The Accords were largely motivated by a shared opposition to Iran, and early progress raised hopes that a broader regional realignment was within reach. There was even cautious optimism that negotiations might withstand the shock of the October 7th attacks.

However, Israel’s decision to resume its military campaign in Gaza following a brief ceasefire appears to have derailed these prospects. For Saudi Arabia, this was a decisive moment. Rather than continuing down the path toward normalization with Israel, the kingdom has pivoted toward closer ties with regional players such as Iran and Turkey.

Under President Donald Trump, U.S. Middle East policy focused heavily on the Abraham Accords. The idea was to bring peace by forging diplomatic and economic ties between Israel and Arab states, despite the longstanding tensions rooted in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While Arab governments had long expressed support for a two-state solution, their commitment had waned in recent years. With Palestinian groups like Hamas aligning more closely with Iran, many Arab leaders began to view the Palestinian issue less as a unifying Arab cause and more as a geopolitical complication.

In 2020, Israel signed normalization agreements with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, sparking speculation that Saudi Arabia could soon follow suit. Though Trump never explicitly framed it this way, the Abraham Accords were clearly about creating a regional bloc opposed to Iran. Unsurprisingly, Tehran vehemently opposed the agreements. The shared strategic interests between Israel and Saudi Arabia, particularly in the wake of Iran’s 2019 drone attack on Saudi oil facilities, fuelled U.S. hopes that the two nations could eventually formalize their relationship.

Talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia continued discreetly during President Biden’s administration, and even after the October 7th attacks, Saudi criticism of Israel was relatively muted. Reports emerged that the Saudis might still consider normalization—if the U.S. provided them with NATO-style security guarantees.

But that possibility has since collapsed. The breakdown of the Gaza ceasefire in February, and Israel’s subsequent escalation of its military campaign, marked a turning point. At the same time, Israeli rhetoric about potentially displacing Palestinians from Gaza and even Prime Minister Netanyahu’s suggestion of establishing a Palestinian state inside Saudi territory were met with outrage. Saudi state media, which had been restrained in its criticism of Israel, began to harshly condemn Netanyahu, describing the Israeli occupation as having no "good face," only "one face"—his.

The kingdom has since become more vocal in advocating for a two-state solution. In March, Saudi Arabia joined other Arab states in proposing an alternative post-war plan for Gaza, which was reportedly dismissed by both Israel and the United States.

In parallel, Saudi Arabia has moved swiftly to strengthen ties with Iran. Just days after Israel renewed its offensive in Gaza, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Iran held talks on regional issues. Soon afterward, Saudi Arabia’s defense minister visited Tehran, marking the highest-level visit by a Saudi royal to Iran in decades. During the visit, a letter from King Salman was delivered to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reportedly expressing support for both a Saudi-Iranian security pact and the ongoing nuclear negotiations between Iran and the U.S.—a dramatic shift from 2015, when both Riyadh and Tel Aviv staunchly opposed President Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran.

This shift signals a broader recalibration of Saudi Arabia’s strategic outlook. The kingdom now appears to view Israel, not Iran, as the primary threat to regional stability. This shift is further underscored by its renewed engagement with Turkey. Despite years of tense relations following the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have recently intensified security cooperation, even coordinating on Syrian affairs. Both nations seem increasingly concerned that Israel’s actions could destabilize the already fragile Syrian state.

While not all these geopolitical shifts are directly tied to Israel’s recent actions, they have certainly accelerated long-standing trends. For instance, the Saudi-Iran rapprochement began as early as 2021 through secret meetings in Iraq and culminated in a China-brokered agreement in 2023. Similarly, Turkey has been working to improve relations with Gulf monarchies for economic reasons, and Saudi Arabia is prioritizing regional peace as part of its ambitious Vision 2030 economic diversification plan.

Still, there’s no denying that Israel’s increasingly aggressive posture has intensified these realignments. Comparing the regional landscape of 2020 with that of 2025 underscores this transformation. In 2020, Iran’s regional proxy network was strong, and the regime was led by hardliner Ebrahim Raisi. Israel, meanwhile, was navigating political turbulence, with Benjamin Netanyahu struggling to form a governing majority. The most stable government during this period was a diverse coalition led by Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett, which suggested a possible shift toward more moderate governance.

Today, the situation has flipped. Iran’s proxy network has been weakened, Raisi has been replaced by reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, and Iranian leaders are actively seeking a new nuclear deal with the U.S. In contrast, Netanyahu remains in power and has steered Israel’s domestic politics further to the right, all while advocating for a broader regional conflict.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the threat to regional stability now emanates more from Jerusalem than from Tehran. This profound shift has implications not just for the future of Israeli-Arab relations, but for the entire strategic landscape of the Middle East.

 references : 

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/04/the-abraham-accords-after-gaza-a-change-of-context?lang=en

https://time.com/6339889/cancel-abraham-accords/

https://www.inss.org.il/publication/iran-saudi-arabia-2025/

https://www.ainvest.com/news/saudi-iran-rapprochement-strategic-pivot-middle-east-stability-investment-opportunities-2504/

https://mepei.com/the-middle-easts-new-chessboard-how-turkiye-and-saudi-arabia-are-redrawing-the-regions-power-map-in-2025/

https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/a-calculus-of-conflict-netanyahus-political-survival-through-extended-war/


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